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a b s t r a c t
Payment for Performance (P4P) aims to improve provider motivation to perform better, but little is
known about the effects of P4P on accountability mechanisms. We examined the effect of P4P in Tanzania
on internal and external accountability mechanisms. We carried out 93 individual in-depth interviews, 9
group interviews and 19 Focus Group Discussions in ﬁve intervention districts in three rounds of data
collection between 2011 and 2013. We carried out surveys in 150 health facilities across Pwani region
and four control districts, and interviewed 200 health workers, before the scheme was introduced and 13
months later. We examined the effects of P4P on internal accountability mechanisms including man-
agement changes, supervision, and priority setting, and external accountability mechanisms including
provider responsiveness to patients, and engagement with Health Facility Governing Committees. P4P
had some positive effects on internal accountability, with increased timeliness of supervision and the
provision of feedback during supervision, but a lack of effect on supervision intensity. P4P reduced the
interruption of service delivery due to broken equipment as well as drug stock-outs due to increased
ﬁnancial autonomy and responsiveness from managers. Management practices became less hierarchical,
with less emphasis on bureaucratic procedures. Effects on external accountability were mixed, health
workers treated pregnant women more kindly, but outreach activities did not increase. Facilities were
more likely to have committees but their role was largely limited. P4P resulted in improvements in
internal accountability measures through improved relations and communication between stakeholders
that were incentivised at different levels of the system and enhanced provider autonomy over funds. P4P
had more limited effects on external accountability, though attitudes towards patients appeared to
improve, community engagement through health facility governing committees remained limited. Im-
plementers should examine the lines of accountability when setting incentives and deciding who to
incentivise in P4P schemes.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Since the 1990s, a variety of accountabilitymechanisms like user
committees, suggestion boxes, performance appraisal of health
workers and maternal death audits have been introduced in low
income countries to enhance health services, but these initiatives
often do not function adequately (Fox, 2015; McCoy et al., 2012).
Payment for Performance (P4P), also called Performance-based
ﬁnancing (PBF), has in recent years been widely promoted in low
income countries to improve providers’ motivation and account-
ability to deliver better care (Meessen et al., 2011; Witter et al.,
2013) by paying bonuses based on the achievement of pre-
speciﬁed performance targets (Ireland et al., 2011; Meessen et al.,
2011; Njuki et al., 2012).
While there is a growing body of evidence evaluating the impact
of P4P, the focus has been primarily on health service outcomes
(Basinga et al., 2011; Bonfrer et al., 2014). Recent studies have paid
more attention to context and the processes by which these out-
comes are or are not achieved, and the effects of P4P on people
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within the health system, their relationships and the work envi-
ronment (Bertone et al., 2016; Bertone and Meessen, 2013;
Bhatnagar and George, 2016; Huillery and Seban, 2014;
Lohmann et al., 2016; Paul et al., 2014; Renmans et al., 2016;
Ssengooba et al., 2012). However, a review of P4P studies con-
cludes that the ﬁndings are often contradictory, that context and
design matter, and that the exact mechanisms that P4P trigger
remain unknown (Renmans et al., 2016). This paper seeks to
contribute to this emerging ﬁeld by assessing whether and to
what degree accountability processes were enhanced by the
Tanzanian P4P scheme.
1.1. Study setting
In January 2011, the Government of Tanzania in collaboration
with Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) introduced a P4P
scheme in Pwani Region, funded by the Government of Norway.
The scheme provided incentive payments in six monthly payment
cycles to all health facilities in the region offering maternal and
child health services based on their achievement of pre-deﬁned
maternal and child health performance targets (Binyaruka et al.,
2015; MoHSW, 2012). 70e75% of the bonus payments went to
staff, approximately 10 percent of their salaries (Binyaruka et al.,
2015:3e4). The rest was earmarked for facility improvement
(MoHSW, 2012). The decision for how facility funds were to be
spent was to be made by health workers and health facility gov-
erning committees (HFGC), comprised of facility in-charge and
community members (URT, 2001) though the community mem-
bers were not eligible for bonus payments. In order to receive
bonus payments facilities had to open bank accounts.
Managers at Council and Regional levels received payments
based on the achievement of facilities in their district/region and
additional targets linked to drug stock-outs in their district/region.
To keep track of facility and district/regional performance, the
Pilot Management Team (PMT), comprised of MOHSW and CHAI
staff, issued score cards indicating their achievement per indica-
tor, bonus earned, bonus distribution between facility and health
workers, the number of health workers eligible, and the next
targets. The implementation of P4P was accompanied by the
introduction of an electronic District Health Information System
(DHIS) used to track performance indicators. In each cycle the PMT
and district managers organized two day performance feedback
meetings with providers.
The P4P programme had a positive effects on two of the eight
service delivery indicators: an eight percent increase in institu-
tional deliveries and a ten percent increase in the provision of
anti-malarials during pregnancy (Binyaruka et al., 2015).
1.2. Accountability measures and assumed pathways of change
In this study we differentiate between internal accountability,
mechanisms that are aimed at relations within and between
different levels of the health system; and external accountability,
aimed at relations between health providers and clients (Cleary
et al., 2013). P4P may improve internal accountability through
more supportive supervision linked to the veriﬁcation of perfor-
mance data, by strengthening relations between managers and
providers through joint incentives, and encouraging providers to
place demands on higher levels (Meessen et al., 2011). P4P may
affect external accountability by encouraging provider respon-
siveness to users (Meessen et al., 2011) to attract clients to meet
targets (Meessen et al., 2007), and increasing outreach, and the
ﬁnancial autonomy linked to P4P may stimulate health facility
governing committees that were otherwise inactive (Falisse et al.,
2012). A complete overview of accountability mechanisms, and Ta
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speciﬁc examples identiﬁed within the Tanzanian context, together
with the assumed pathway of change is provided in Table 1. Pro-
posed indicators to measure each mechanism are also described
here and presented in the Data Collection section.
1.3. Data collection
This study used a mix methods design. Qualitative data was
collected in ﬁve of the seven intervention districts selected to
represent peri-urban (Kibaha town and Bagamoyo), rural (Mkur-
anga and Kisarawe) and remote settings (Maﬁa island). Fifteen
health facilities were purposively selected to represent variations in
level of care and ownership: thirteen were public, one was private,
and one faith-based. The data collection took place in three rounds
over the period December 2011eMarch 2013, covering various
programme stages (Fig. 1). Although the programme started in
2011, the ﬁrst cycle involved compiling baseline data with training
on performance indicators occurring in the second half of 2011, and
the initial round of performance payment being made in 2012.
In-depth interviews were carried out with health workers,
managers at council level and national level and stakeholders.
Group interviews were conducted with regional managers and
health facility committee members from three government facil-
ities. A total of 93 individual in-depth interviews (IDIs), 9 group
interviews and 18 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted
by four social scientists working in pairs. The interviews were
recorded digitally and subsequently transcribed and translated into
English. Observations of performance feedback meetings and data
veriﬁcation activities were also done.
Quantitative data collection was done in January 2012 and
thirteen months later. Health facility and health worker surveys
were carried out before and after the implementation of P4P in all
seven intervention districts in Pwani region and four comparison
districts (Kilwa, Mvomero, Morogoro town and Morogoro rural). A
total of 150 facilities, 75 in the intervention and 75 in the com-
parison group were sampled, representing 46% of all eligible facil-
ities in Pwani and 34% of all facilities in the comparison districts. In
each facility one or two health workers delivering reproductive and
child health services picked at random from those on duty were
also interviewed. Facilities were randomly sampled amongst those
where P4P was implemented and matching comparison facilities
were selected based on provider type, ownership, and case load
(Borghi et al., 2013).
1.4. Data analysis
We used the Cleary et al. framework to deﬁne internal and
external accountability. We then identiﬁed relevant themes within
the qualitative data, and indicators within the surveys (Table 1).
Verbatim transcriptions of qualitative data were ﬁrst read to get an
overall impression. A coding system was then developed and the
data was managed and coded using NVivo 10 software.
The quantitative indicators measured are summarised in Table 1.
We used a difference-in-difference linear regression model to
isolate the effect of P4P on the outcomes of interest, as shown in
Equation (1).
Equation 1
Yijt ¼ b0 þ b1

P4Pj  dt
þ b2dt þ gj þ εijt (1)
In all models, we included facility ﬁxed effects (gjÞ to control for
facility-level unobserved time invariant characteristics, and year
ﬁxed effects (dtÞ a dummy variable taking the value of 0 at baseline
and 1 at endline, with health worker outcomes clustered at the
facility level. The effect of P4P on outcomes is estimated as b1. We
conﬁrmed the robustness and precision of our results to: removing
the facility ﬁxed effects from the model; using non-linear (logit)
models for binary outcomes; and, clustering standard errors at the
district level (Cameron and Miller, 2015). To adjust for multiple
outcome testing, we applied a Bonferroni correction which ac-
counts for possible correlation between outcomes (Bonfrer et al.,
2014a,b). The lagged dependent variable approach has been pro-
posed as an alternative approach to difference-in-differences. It
maximises statistical power and, when trends are not parallel,
produces unbiased results. As we were unable to test whether the
pre-intervention trends in the speciﬁc outcomes considered in this
paper were parallel, we applied a lagged dependent variable
approach as a further robustness check (McKenzie, 2012a,b; Ozler,
2015).
All analyses were carried out at the health facility level. To
generate health facility values for indictors collected at the health
worker level, the maximum value reported at a given facility was
selected for supervision outcomes andmean scores were estimated
for indicators of satisfaction with community relations across
health workers in the same facility (McKenzie, 2012a,b).
2. Results
We present the P4P scheme's effects on internal and external
accountability mechanisms. The ﬁndings are summarised in
Table 4.
2.1. Internal accountability
2.1.1. Content and frequency of supervision
There was no effect of P4P on the number of supervision visits
by managers. However, there was a reduction of 17% (SE: 7.1) in the
Fig. 1. Qualitative data collection in relation to programme implementation.
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number of facilities reporting that supervision happened less than
once per quarter (see Table 1) - the recommended frequency for
supervision visits. Managers indicated that they could not increase
the intensity of visits due to a lack of funds for fuel and allowances,
and the council cars were often not available:
Supportive supervision is not done as it is supposed to be, because
we have transport problems. We have one car and it is being used
for many activities. You may plan to go for supervision, but in the
end you realize that the only car has been assigned for a different
activity (FGD with council managers, November 2012).
However, the interviews withmanagers revealed that theywere
very concerned about reaching targets, and health workers re-
ported that managers were keen to supervise health workers, help
facilities achieve their targets, and ensure that they provide correct
and timely data. In all districts, health workers and managers
worked together after the ofﬁcial working time, something that had
rarely happened before:
During the ﬁrst visit, they came here around 9 pm […] we worked
with the regional and district managers until 12 midnight. If you
wanted to leave they became very aggressive (FGD with health
workers, October 2012)
As for the content of the supervision visits, some health workers
felt that the supervision visits simply focused on collecting data/
reports in the early phase. From the second quarter of 2012 on-
wards, however, health workers felt their managers were more
pro-active in solving problems. The survey data revealed P4P had a
positive and signiﬁcant effect on the provision of both positive and
negative feedback during supervision (þ24.8% SE: 11.4 and þ 28.3%
SE 10.9 respectively), but there were no other effects noted
(Table 2).
2.1.2. Financial accountability and autonomy
Health workers expressed satisfaction with the transparent
processes surrounding the allocation of the bonus payments. This
was facilitated by the score cards which indicated the total amount
of bonus earned by the facility, and its distribution between health
workers and the facility:
Everything is done in a transparent way. We know how much the
facility gets, how much for staff … To be honest it is difﬁcult to get
such information for other (funding) sources (FGD with health
workers, October 2012).
The fact that bonus funds were channelled directly to the fa-
cilities’ bank accounts minimized the risk of misuse of funds by
district level managers. The direct and transparent payment of
funds, as well as more frequent contact with their managers was
reported to enhance trust and improve the relationship between
health workers and their managers. However, health workers
complained that score cards were not updated every payment cycle
to reﬂect the actual number of bonus beneﬁciaries. If new staff had
been hired, the bonus for each individual would be lower thanwhat
the scorecard indicated.
Health workers at public facilities appreciated the autonomy
they had in deciding how to use P4P funds for facility improvement.
Two out of three facilities reported that they had used the funds to
make the facilities more attractive and thus increase the chance of
reaching targets.
While P4P had no effect on coverage of community based health
insurance (the Community Health Fund) at the facility (see Table 3),
health workers were able to retain some of the premiums collected
in their bank accounts, increasing resource availability.
2.1.3. Resource prioritisation to meet targets
We found evidence of district and facility managers re-
allocating staff in order to meet targets as shortages of skilled
and efﬁcient staff were identiﬁed as the cause of poor performance
among certain facilities. In one case the council healthmanagement
team (CHMT) decided to transfer a clinical ofﬁcer to a dispensary
that was run by a nurse and had failed to submit the performance
data. In another case, a facility manager requested additional
stafﬁng support from the district:
We needed someone to assist our nurse on RCH activities, so what I
did was to request one nurse [from the CHMT] and they gave us one
(Health worker, July 2012)
In other cases districts upgraded dispensaries to enable them to
provide delivery care services and meet targets:
Some of our facilities were not providing delivery services […]. They
[the PMT] decided to stop paying us [the bonus] until our dispen-
saries provide delivery services. We decided to make sure that every
dispensary set aside a room for deliveries (District manager, July
2012)
In addition to a lack of qualiﬁed staff, many health facilities were
struggling to ensure they had the drugs, supplies and equipment
needed to meet targets. District managers reported that health
workers were more likely to report stock outs and to expect sup-
port from district managers to address this:
Now, if they don't have vaccines or gas they perceive it as an
emergency, and they will communicate it to you as an emergency.
In the past, they did not care when they were out of gas, but now
they know that if they don't have gas they will not be able to
achieve their targets (District manager, July 2012)
Health workers also reported that managers were more
responsive than before in addressing drug and supply constraints at
the facility level:
Nowadays if there's a shortage of medicines you only have to make
a call to the DRCHCo [District Reproductive and Child Health
Coordinator] and immediately without a delay they are brought,
since if s/he delays then s/he will also lose out [smiled] (Health
worker, January 2012)
The survey data indicated P4P signiﬁcantly reduced the stock
out rate of drugs and medical supplies by 16.9% (SE: 5.8) and 15.2%
(5.1) respectively and the interruption of service delivery due to
broken equipment by 14.9% (7.3) (Table 3).
In most cases, the use of facility-level P4P funds was linked
directly to the targets, like buying anti-malarials for pregnant
women and paying traditional birth attendants (TBAs) to bring
women for deliveries, installing solar power in maternity wards,
and buying oxytocin. However, some health workers, particularly at
hospitals, questioned their ability to reach targets and provide
quality services due to the constraints in the system. They argued
that basic medical supplies and equipment should have been in
place before the introduction of P4P:
The work environment remained the same, and we have the same
resources. We have been informed about the targets and we have to
struggle to achieve the goals, but P4P did not bring any new
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equipment. … I am still doing surgery in a room with no AC. (…) If
there is nomedicine I can't be blamed for not having played my role
(Health worker, February 2012).
In two of the districts, health workers and managers expressed
concern about the lack of adequate support from some of the dis-
trict managers who were not eligible for P4P bonuses. In one case
this was the District Executive Director (DED), in the other case it
was a councillor. In both cases, these authority ﬁgures were criti-
cized for not prioritising the health department - which eventually
affected P4P implementation:
Our cars are under the control of the District Executive Director.
This department (health) might not be able to implement its ac-
tivities because the cars are being used by other departments at the
council level. […] The transport problem affects us especially on the
issue of data validation; we fail to do data validation on time
(District manager, October 2012)
In response to this situation, the Regional Administrative Sec-
retary (RAS) wrote a warning letter to both the DED and the district
medical ofﬁcer (DMO), instructing them to ensure availability of a
car for data veriﬁcation. Soon after, the DED reportedly released a
Table 2
Effect of P4P on human resource management.
Baseline Difference in difference
InterventionMean (SD) Comparison Mean (SD) Difference (P-
Value)
N Fixed Effects Beta (SE)
Frequency of supervisions
Number of district/regional supervision carried out 1.7 1.5 0.2 272 0.1
(2.8) (1.8) (0.64) (0.5)
Last supervision received in the last 30 days (0e1) (%) 57.7 49.3 8.4 266 15.1
(49.7) (50.3) (0.31) (11.9)
Last supervision received in the last 31e90 days (0e1) (%) 31.0 41.3 10.0 266 2.0
(46.6) (49.6) (0.19) (12.0)
Last supervision received more than 90 days (0e1) (%) 11.3 9.3 1.9 266 17.1**
(31.8) (29.3) (0.70) (7.1)
Content of supervision from facility survey
Check records/reports (0e1) (%) 51.7 50.8 0.9 271 6.9
(50.4) (50.4) (0.92) (13.0)
Check drug supply (0e1) (%) 16.7** 33.8** 17.0** 264 8.8
(37.6) (47.7) (0.023) (12.1)
Check service delivery (0e1) (%) 21.7* 35.4* 14.0* 261 9.2
(41.5) (48.2) (0.09) (13.7)
Provide positive feed-back (0e1) (%) 10.0*** 29.2*** 19*** 265 24.8**
(30.3) (45.8) (0.00) (11.4)
Provide negative feed-back (0e1) (%) 8.3*** 27.7*** 19*** 268 28.3**
(27.9) (45.1) (0.00) (10.9)
Provide updates (0e1) (%) 18.3 21.5 3.2 263 0.5
(39.0) (41.4) (0.66) (12.3)
Discuss problems (0e1) (%) 23.3 26.2 2.8 264 0.4
(42.7) (44.3) (0.71) (12.2)
Deliver supplies (0e1) (%) 8.3 3.1 5.3 260 18.2**
(27.9) (17.4) (0.21) (8.2)
Content of supervision from health worker survey
Bring drugs/supplies (0e1) (%) 17.1 17.3 0.2 265 14.9
(38.0) (38.1) (0.97) (10.9)
Check records (0e1) (%) 48.6 56.0 7.4 265 1.1
(50.3) (50.0) (0.37) (12.8)
Check ﬁnances (0e1) (%) 2.9 5.3 2.5 265 8.8
(16.8) (22.6) (0.45) (6.2)
Observe consultation (0e1) (%) 4.3 10.7 6.4 265 3.7
(20.4) (31.1) (0.15) (7.7)
Check knowledge (0e1) (%) 11.4 21.3 9.9 265 10.5
(32.0) (41.2) (0.11) (10.4)
Instruct on service delivery (0e1) (%) 30.0 25.3 4.7 265 13.9
(0.462) (43.8) (0.53) (10.9)
Instruct on ﬁlling HMIS (0e1) (%) 14.3 14.7 0.4 265 2.0
(35.2) (35.6) (0.95) (9.7)
Discuss performance (0e1) (%) 24.3 22.7 1.6 265 1.5
(43.2) (42.1) (0.82) (10.9)
Inspect facility (0e1) (%) 15.7*** 37.3*** 22.0*** 265 12.1
(36.7) (48.7) (0.00) (11.4)
Do nothing (0e1) (%) 11.4* 4.0* 7.4* 265 5.6
(32.0) (197) (0.09) (5.6)
Other
No. of admin./managerial meetings in past 90 days 2.0 1.8 0.2 271 0.1
(1.1) (1.2) (0.30) (0.4)
Health workers reporting selection for training based on need (0e1) (%) 23.5 21.2 2.4 276 3.9
(41.0) (37.7) (0.73) (9.5)
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Sample: 150 health facility in two time periods.
Beta (SE) are coefﬁcients for continuous variables and percentage changes for binary indicators and their means.
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car to CHMT.
2.1.4. Organizational culture and cooperation
The qualitative data suggested that health staff felt that relations
with managers had improved, with the latter becoming more
accessible and less hierarchical in their dealings with providers:
There are changes. It is not like in the previous days where they
(CHMT members) used to be the real bosses; they were not
listening, but rather directing you on what to do. … nowadays
when they come you discuss with them, and they may even ask if
there is any staff member who has a problem. (…) The DMO may
even give you his contact details (Health facility in-charge, April
2012)
Increased interactions between providers and their managers
helped to improve trust between the two parties, facilitated
communication, and contributed to establishing a good working
relationship. In short, there was a sense of common goal. On the
managers side they appreciated the efforts made by providers to
meet targets:
P4P has created a good relationship between the CHMT and health
facility staff in the district, to the extent that they (providers) do
respond positively once we visit or tell them anything about data -
they are ready and they do understand us. Now they are doing their
best and the situation is different from before. (District manager,
February 2013)
District level managers also felt that the PMT was supportive to
their needs, ﬁnding ways of solving the problems together, and
overcoming bottlenecks rather than giving instructions and then
leaving, as was the case with national managers in the past:
Before, something could take six months to reach (…) the Ministry.
But now, (…) if it is something to do with MSD [Medical Store
Department] for example - (…) they can call them straight away. In
the end the problem that you discussed today has been solved the
next day! So it has really helped to minimize bureaucracies (Dis-
trict manager, July 2012)
At the dispensary level, health workers reported that P4P had
entailed more collaboration, with tasks being shared between
workers rather than having people assigned to speciﬁc activities,
like vaccinations and ﬁlling in forms:
Before (P4P) the exercise of ﬁlling forms was done by the RCH nurse
alone, but since P4P implementation started we work together. If
she (the nurse) is not present at the RCH department the other staff
will take care of it; we don't want to lose mothers who seek RCH
services (FGD with health workers, 2012).
At hospitals, on the other hand, the unequal distribution of
bonus payments between RCH staff (60%) and non-RCH staff (30%)
created tensions:
We depend on each other. If there is no doctor at RCH any doctor
can support RCH work. There was a time we asked why RCH are
paid more (FGD with CHMT, November 2012).
There was no effect of P4P on the quantitative indicators
considered (the number of administrative/managerial meetings
held during the last 90 days; the allocation of training opportunities
according to need) (Table 2).
Table 3
Effect of P4P on ﬁnancial accountability and resource prioritisation.
Baseline Difference in difference
Intervention Mean Comparison Mean Difference N Fixed Effects Beta
(SD) (SD) (P-value) (SE)
Facility with functioning community health fund (CHF) (%) 79.5*** 55.6*** 24.0*** 295 2.9
(40.7) (50.0) (0.00) (7.3)
Number of CHF members 22.7 14.7 8.01 217 8.5
(40.0) (31.9) (0.24) (12.9)
Equipment functioning index (a) (0e1) (%) 56.7 54.8 1.9 295 3.2
(18.2) (17.2) (0.53) (4.3)
Service delivery disruption due to broken equipment in last 90 days (%) 25.4** 12.2** 13.0** 292 14.9**
(43.8) (32.9) (0.04) (7.3)
Vaccines stock-out index (0e1) (b) (%) 17.1 12.9 4.2 276 10.2*
(30.7) (28.0) (0.41) (5.6)
Drug stock-out index (0e1) (c) (%) 54.4* 46.0* 8.4* 295 16.9***
(23.5) (27.8) (0.05) (5.8)
Medical supplies stock-out index (d) (0e1) (%) 39.4*** 26.1*** 0.13.0*** 275 15.2***
(25.3) (23.5) (0.00) (5.1)
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Sample: 150 health facility in two time periods.
(a) Equipment includes: BP apparatus available at least one, Stethoscope apparatus, Time/watch, Infant/child weighing scale, MUAC measuring tape, Test kit for hemoglobin,
Re-agents for test kit for hemoglobin, Neonatal ambu-bag & mask, Incubator, Autoclave equipment, Cord clamps apparatus, Infant laryngoscope, Mucus suction apparatus,
Delivery kits, Delivery table, Vacuum extractor, Thermometer, Examination torch/lamp, Stainless steel bowls.
(b) Vaccine includes vaccine against Tetanus, BCG, OPV, DPT, Measles.
(c) Drugs includes: ALU-Blisters 24, ALU-Blisters 18, ALU-Blisters 12, ALU-Blisters 6, Quinine tablets, Quinine syrup, Quinine injection, SP [IPTp], Anti-malarial availability
index, ALU-Blisters 24, ALU-Blisters 18, ALU-Blisters 12, ALU-Blisters 6, Quinine tablets, Quinine syrup, Quinine injection, SP [IPTp], Anti-malarial index,,Cotrimo-xazola
tablets, Cotrimo-xazola syrup, Flagly tablets, Flagly injection, Gentamycin injection 20 mg, Gentamycin injection 80 mg, Ampiciline tablets, Ampiciline injection, Ampiciline
syrup, Chloramphenical tablets, Chloramphenical injection, Chloramphenical syrup, X-pen injection, Antibiotics availability index,Cotrimo-xazola tablets, Cotrimo-xazola
syrup, Flagly tablets, Flagly injection, Gentamycin injection 20 mg, Gentamycin injection 80 mg, Ampiciline tablets, Ampiciline injection, Ampiciline syrup, Chlor-
amphenical tablets, Chloramphenical injection, Chloramphenical syrup, X-pen injection, Antibiotics index, Aldomet tablets, Hydralazine tablets, Hydralazine injection,
Nifedipine tablets, Anti-hypertensive drugs availability index.
(d) Medical supplies include: Sterile latex gloves, Disinfection, Cotton wool, Malaria RDT, Glass slide malaria test, Partograph, Sutures, Urine catheters, Suction catheters,
Oxygen supply, Gas supply.
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2.2. External accountability measures
2.2.1. Responsiveness to clients and community relations
In order to achieve targets, health workers reported changing
their attitudes towards clients:
Currently pregnant women are enticed to come to deliver at the
health facility to the extent that they are surprised. This is different
from the situation in the past when they were given harsh words.
Now health workers use polite language and this is a result of P4P
[…] (Health worker, January 2012)
The survey data conﬁrmed that there was a 0.38 point increase
in the mean provider kindness score during delivery (95% CI:0.06
to 0.80), although this was not signiﬁcant at p < 0.05 level
(Binyaruka et al., 2015). There was no P4P effect on provider re-
lations with community leaders. Outreach services were not tar-
geted by P4P, but health workers identiﬁed outreach activities as a
mechanism for increasing utilization and therefore something that
could be indirectly affected by P4P. However, our informants
explained that outreach activities could not be performed due to a
lack of funds:
Another challenge is that (…) staff fails to do mobile outreach
services to offer vaccines.… Due to transport problems staff do not
go for outreach (CHMT member, December 2011).
The quantitative analysis also found no effect on the number of
facilities having outreach services or on the number of outreach
services performed (Table 5).
2.2.2. Involvement of health facility governing committees
Although Health Facility Governing Committees (HFGCs) were
to be involved in the planning of the use of the health facility bonus,
community members within the HFGCs had not been trained and
were not incentivised, and at most facilities the procedure was not
followed:
Usually the staff meeting decides howmuch money we want to use
and what we want to buy. This is the procedure used […]. [Thenwe]
leave it to the committee to approve it (Health worker, October
2012).
Community members on the committee argued that they failed
to participate in the discussion of committee issues because they
perceived them as being scholarly/technical and decisions were left
to the providers. Committee members were sometimes called to
conﬁrm the receipt of supplies purchased by P4P money, but they
did not feel well informed about the purchases:
We check the drugs, but what I usually ask myself is this: ‘What
about the remaining drugs, where are they?’ (FGD with HFGC
members, March 2013).
However, anecdotal evidence shows that in 2015, some health
workers used their own P4P bonus to pay committee members an
allowance for attending meetings and to travel to the bank for
withdrawal of P4P funds. Survey data showed that P4P was asso-
ciated with a positive and signiﬁcant increase in the probability of
having held a HFGC meeting in the last 90 days (þ18%, SE: 9.1)
(though this is not robust to sensitivity analysis (Annex Table 3A),
Table 4
Overview of P4P effects on accountability.
Expected effects of P4P
(theory of change)
Evidence of positive effects No, limited, or negative effects and identiﬁed obstacles
Internal Accountability
Frequency of supervision Less facilities report last supervision receivedmore
than 90 days ago
No effect on number of district/regional supervision visits carried out
Lack of resources (vehicles and funds for allowances)
Content of supportive supervision Provide positive and negative feedback No effects on other indicators for content of supervision
Emphasis on data collection, not on quality of services
Financial accountability and autonomy Score cards enhanced trust
Used P4P funds to increase chances of reaching
targets
Limited ﬁnancial autonomy over other funds
No effect on number of facilities with functioning Community Health Fund
(CHF)
No effect on number of CHF members
No effect on equipment functioning
Resource prioritisation to meet targets Staff reallocated within the district
Reduced stock-out rates
Reduced service delivery disruption due to broken
equipment
Poor performing staff transferred, not ﬁred
District managers outside the health sector may not prioritise using
resources on P4P related activities
Organizational culture and cooperation Less hierarchical
Less bureaucratic
Teamwork spirit enhanced
HW exert pressure on management
Management more responsive to facility requests
No effect on number of administrative/managerial meetings
No effect on health workers reporting selection for training based on need
At hospital level RCH staff was prioritised, and this was seen as unfair by
other staff
External accountability
Enhancing provider responsiveness to
users and improve relationship
with local community
Kindness to women during deliveries enhanced No effect on patient experience of interpersonal care for the other targeted
services
No effect on HW satisfaction with relationship with local leaders
No effect on number of facilities having outreach services
No effect on number of outreach visits
Lack funds for fuel and allowances
Role of Health Facility Governing
Committees enhanced
Higher probability of holding meetings No effect on number of facilities with committee
No effect on record keeping
Role limited to approval of plans, lack knowledge/conﬁdence, not invited
No funds for transport/meeting allowance
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but not on their record keeping. While the overall role of the
committees was limited in relation to P4P, there was one case
where the committee members were able to track the misuse of
TSh. 614,000 bonus funds for facility improvement and action
against the responsible health worker was taken. In this case, a
ward councillor led the process, a factor that may explain the
committee's success.
3. Discussion
The theory of change of P4P suggests that such schemes will
have a positive effect on supervision, and that this is particularly
important in contexts where most primary facilities in rural areas
are staffed by lower grade staff (Meessen et al., 2006). P4P was
indeed found to increase the timeliness of supervision and had a
positive effect on the provision of feedback, particularly in relation
to data veriﬁcation. These changes are clearly linked to the team-
work spirit that P4P enhanced. The increased supervision by dis-
trict managers seemed to be in part linked to their role in data
veriﬁcation.
Recent WHO recommendations state that the autonomy of
providers “is a critical prerequisite” for P4P programs to be suc-
cessful (WHO, 2016). We found evidence that health workers pri-
oritised the use of P4P bonus payments for strategies that would
help them to meet targets, and that this was facilitated by greater
ﬁnancial autonomy linked to P4P, a ﬁnding reported elsewhere
(Meessen et al., 2011). Indeed, there was a signiﬁcant reduction in
the stock out rate of drugs and medical supplies, and reduction in
service disruption due to broken equipment. In the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), in contrast, P4P had a negative effect on
the availability of equipment. This was because the facilities
reduced user fees in order to attract more clients, but did not
succeed in this. Their incomewas thus reduced (Huillery and Seban,
2014).
As for organizational culture, we found evidence from the
qualitative data that P4P helped improve communication and
interpersonal relations between health workers and their man-
agers; though we had less evidence of this from the limited
quantitative data. Knowing that their own bonus and their district's
rating compared to other districts depended on the performance of
health workers, managers at the district level treated health
workers in a less authoritarian way. This stands in contrast to a
study from Beninwhere the authors found that PBF “does not seem
to foster collaboration and teamwork between levels of the health
system under the World Bank model, probably because it relies
mostly on external actors” (Paul et al., 2014: 212).
In addition to supervision, the improved collaboration also
helped in the reduction of stock-outs of drugs and medical sup-
plies and health workers reportedly pushed their managers to
deliver. The effects on the stock out of medical supplies and drugs
were similar to that reported previously (Binyaruka and Borghi,
2017; Anselmi et al. 2017). Differences in the size of the coefﬁ-
cient are due to a difference in the classiﬁcation of drugs and
supplies in the former study, and a difference in the analytical
approach in the latter which estimated mediators at the house-
hold level and included household level covariates in the regres-
sion analysis. District managers reported more responsiveness
from the national P4P team compared to what they were used to
from national level managers. District managers on their side
were also pro-active in addressing issues they identiﬁed as bar-
riers to meeting targets, including the reallocation of staff to meet
facility needs, and supporting facilities to provide delivery care
services where these services were not available. Unlike in
Rwanda, where facilities had greater autonomy than in Tanzania
(Meessen et al., 2011), providers did not have the power to hire
and ﬁre staff, but they were found to engage with district man-
agers about human resource issues. Moreover, in contrast to the
DRC (Huillery and Seban, 2014), where the facility head could
decide on the payment distribution among health workers, and
Nigeria (Bhatnagar and George, 2016), where the bonus payments
were individualized based on performance, the bonus was equal
for all health staff at primary facilities in Tanzania, something that
Table 5
Effect of P4P on external accountability indicators.
Baseline Difference in difference
Intervention
Mean
Comparison Mean T-test N Fixed Effects Beta
(SD) (SD) (P-value) (SE)
Governing committee
Facility with governing committee (0e1) (%) 73.4 70.0 3.4 283 2.0
(44.5) (46.2) (0.66) (10.5)
Governing committee met in the past 90 days (0e1) (%) 94.4 93.2 1.3 291 18.2**
(23.1) (25.4) (0.75) (9.1)
Records of governing committee meeting available (0e1) (%) 92.5** 80.3** 12.2** 250 6.0
(26.5) (40.1) (0.04) (8.3)
Outreach services
Facility has outreach services (0e1) (%) 60.3 58.3 2.0 295 12.3
(49.3) (49.6) (0.81) (9.0)
Number of outreach visits in past 90 days 2.0 2.0 0.1 295 52.1
(2.8) (2.3) (0.87) (61.7)
HW satisfaction local relationship
Mean HW satisfaction with safety in community (0e1) (%) 59.2 57.8 1.4 291 17.3*
(45.8) (45.9) (0.86) (9.8)
Mean HW satisfaction with relationship with local leaders (0e1) (%) 69.0* 57.1* 11.9* 291 11.9
(40.9) (45.6) (0.10) (9.7)
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Sample: 150 health facility in two time periods.
Beta (SE) are coefﬁcients for continuous variables and percentage changes for binary indicators and their means.
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contributed to a feeling of fairness.
Improved cooperation between different levels within the
system was clearly driven by having a shared goal: reaching P4P
targets. In two of the ﬁve districts, managers at the district level
who were neither eligible for bonuses nor had speciﬁc perfor-
mance indicators (a District Executive Director and a district
councillor), did not prioritise spending resources on P4P, despite
the fact that the DEDs were supposed to sign the P4P performance
agreement (MoHSW, 2012). This demonstrates that there is a need
to examine the lines of accountability within the local context
when setting incentives and deciding who to incentivise. In this
case, incentivising DEDs may have resulted in greater cooperation
in sharing needed resources for the implementation of P4P.
However, one would also risk that incentives to DEDs would make
them prioritise P4P activities at the cost of activities in other
sectors.
P4P is expected to have a positive effect on external account-
ability through services that are more responsive to patient needs.
The reported increase in provider kindness during deliveries
(Binyaruka et al., 2015), provides some evidence of this, and is likely
to reduce the number of home births (Kruk et al., 2014). As in
Rwanda (Kalk et al., 2010), health workers started to see their pa-
tients as clients that should be treated well.
In contrast to the DRC and Rwanda (Huillery and Seban, 2014;
Renmans et al., 2016), there was no effect on outreach services,
which are important for utilization and access for the poor in
remote communities. Health workers and managers argued that
although they wanted to conduct outreach, there was a lack of
resources and the facility bonus was not large enough to facilitate
such services. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the ﬁndings of other studies
which have shown that in the design of P4P schemes, there are
often unrealistic expectations of what institutions can actually do,
and an underestimation of constraints (Ireland et al., 2011:695;
Ssengooba et al., 2012).
The P4P designwas based on the assumption that giving HFGCs
a role in how the facility bonus was to be spent, and in the
withdrawal of the funds, would encourage them to be active. We
found that P4P enhanced committees' potential of holding
meetings, but the role of the HFGCmembers was generally limited
to approval of decisions and budgets that had been made by the
health workers. HFGCs limited involvement may also have been
due to a lack of explicit incentive to community members within
the committee. This is an important difference between the Tan-
zanian P4P scheme design and the Burundian one (Falisse et al.,
2012). Committees also lacked funds to organize meetings. Last
but not least, the power imbalance between the educated health
workers and the committee members is very high, and HFGCs in
Tanzania have been found to have great problems challenging
health workers (Wales et al., 2014). As Fox et al. have pointed out,
enhancing the level of information is not enough for social
accountability measures to be successful - grassroots stakeholders
also need to have ‘teeth’ (Fox, 2015). In the one case where a HFGC
had taken disciplinary actions against a clinical ofﬁcer in-charge
who had misspent the P4P funds, the committee received sup-
port from a ward councillor.
Our study suffers from some limitations. Our measure of
external accountability is limited to the two indicators that can be
feasiblymeasuredwith the data available. Althoughwe did conduct
interviews with HFGCs that included community members, we did
not conduct interviews with a wider set of community members to
explore their perceptions of accountability. Hence our assessment
of external accountability is inevitably narrower than that of in-
ternal accountability. Neither do we have data showing the relative
size of P4P bonuses compared to other sources of income. More-
over, the surveys included a large number of questions, which may
have resulted in respondent fatigue. For the quantitative indicators
of accountability, therewas variation in the number of observations
available for different indicators, with data incompleteness being
greatest for the number of CHF members. This limits the general-
isability of some of the indicators across the sample. The difference-
in edifference design used for the quantitative analysis relies on
the assumption of parallel trends in outcomes in intervention and
comparison areas. Although trends for the outcome variables
considered in this analysis could not be tested due to a lack of data
on pre-intervention trends, the pre-intervention trends in facility
level outpatient visits and other services were parallel. The results
obtained using the lagged dependent variable approach were
generally similar to those from the difference in differences anal-
ysis. However, the effects of P4P on ﬁve of the outcomes were no
longer statistically signiﬁcant (discussion of problems and delivery
of supplies during the supervision, service delivery disruption due
to broken equipment in the last 90 days and vaccine and medical
supplies stock out) (Appendix Table 4A).
4. Conclusion
The P4P pilot in Tanzania contributed to some improvement in
internal accountability measures such as timeliness of supervision
and provision of positive and negative feedback. The active
involvement of the PMT, and the presence of shared goals be-
tween managers and providers, appears to have played a central
role for these improvements. The improved relations between
managers and providers, and greater teamwork, coupled with
enhanced provider autonomy over funds, entailed an improved
handling of systemic challenges like staff availability and lack of
medicines and supplies. P4P had more limited effect on external
accountability. Though attitudes towards patients appeared to
improve, in general community engagement through health fa-
cility governing committees remained limited. Implementers
should examine the lines of accountability within the local
context when setting incentives and deciding who to incentivise
in P4P schemes.
Acknowledgments
The Government of Norway funded the data collection for the
programme evaluation that was used in this paper. The UK
Department for International Development as part of the Con-
sortium for Research on Resilient and Responsive Health Systems
supported the funding of the authors’ time undertaking data re-
analysis and writing. The Research Council of Norway also sup-
ported the time of IM, SL, MM and JB. The funding bodies had no
role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to pub-
lish or preparation of the manuscript. Thanks are due to Irene
Mashasi, Ikunda Njau, and Albert Majura who participated in the
qualitative data collection, as well as the surveyors taking part in
quantitative data collection.
I. Mayumana et al. / Social Science & Medicine 179 (2017) 61e73 69
Appendices
Table 1A
Effect of P4P on human resource management indicators, sensitivity analysis.
OLS (Facility SE
clustering)
OLS (Facility ﬁxed
effects)
OLS (Facility ﬁxed
effects and
standard errors
clustered at the
district level)
Logit marginal
effects (Facility
ﬁxed effects)
N Beta N Beta N Beta N Beta
(P-value) (P-value) (P-value) (P-value)
Frequency of supervision
Number of district/regional supervision carried out 272 0.097 272 0.1 272 0.1
(0.847) (0.807) (0.775)
Last supervision received in the last 30 days (0e1) (%) 266 4.92 266 15.1 266 15.1 98 16.7
(0.666) (0.209) (0.230) (0.233)
Last supervision received in the last 31e90 days (0e1) (%) 266 10.3 266 2.0 266 2.0 98 3.6
(0.365) (0.867) (0.844) (0.803)
Last supervision received more than 90 days (0e1) (%) 266 15.3** 266 17.1** 266 17.1 36 369
(0.030) (0.018) (0.514) (0.995)
Content of supervision from facility surveys
Check records/reports (0e1) (%) 271 0.90 271 6.9 271 6.9 126 4.8
(0.942) (0.600) (0.550) (0.708)
Check drug supply (0e1) (%) 264 13.3 264 8.8 264 8.8 122 2.0
(0.242) (0.469) (0.741) (0.878)
Check service delivery (0e1) (%) 261 17.0 261 9.2 261 9.2 130 8.3
(0.177) (0.504) (0.494) (0.505)
Provide positive feed-back (0e1) (%) 265 29.4*** 265 24.8** 265 24.8 88 33.6**
(0.006) (0.031) (0.185) (0.016)
Provide negative feed-back (0e1) (%) 268 31.2*** 268 28.3** 268 28.3* 88 38.6***
(0.002) (0.010) (0.080) (0.005)
Provide updates (0e1) (%) 263 3.82 263 0.5 263 0.5 108 3.3
(0.737) (0.967) (0.984) (0.811)
Discuss problems (0e1) (%) 264 3.59 264 0.4 264 0.4 110 7.4
(0.754) (0.976) (0.984) (0.588)
Deliver supplies (0e1) (%) 260 12.7* 260 18.2** 260 18.2 48 40.3*
(0.093) (0.028) (0.497) (0.058)
Content of supervision from health worker survey
Bring drugs/supplies (0e1) (%) 265 11.5 265 14.9 265 14.9 82 18.2
(0.264) (0.175) (0.572) (0.230)
Check records (0e1) (%) 265 4.10 265 1.1 265 1.1 110 0.0
(0.733) (0.933) (0.968) (1.000)
Check ﬁnances (0e1) (%) 265 5.81 265 8.8 265 8.8 26 42.3*
(0.316) (0.158) (0.738) (0.096)
Observe consultation (0e1) (%) 265 3.05 265 3.7 265 3.7 40 12.4
(0.669) (0.635) (0.515) (0.578)
Check knowledge (0e1) (%) 265 9.90 265 10.5 265 10.5 72 17.5
(0.312) (0.315) (0.385) (0.284)
Instruct on service delivery (0e1) (%) 265 16.3 265 13.9 265 13.9 80 21.2
(0.114) (0.205) (0.165) (16.8)
Instruct on ﬁlling HMIS (0e1) (%) 265 1.29 265 2.0 265 2.0 62 0.061
(0.882) (0.834) (0.939) (0.738)
Discuss performance (0e1) (%) 265 0.048 265 1.5 265 1.5 78 2.4
(0.996) (0.887) (0.953) (0.882)
Inspect facility (0e1) (%) 265 21.6** 265 12.1 265 12.1 86 17.1
(0.043) (0.287) (0.644) (0.257)
Do nothing (0e1) (%) 265 5.76 265 5.6 265 5.6 22 13.7
(0.249) (0.323) (0.832) (0.658)
Other
No. of admin./managerial meetings in past 90 days 271 0.017 271 0.1 271 0.1
(0.957) (0.701) (0.755)
Health workers reporting selection for training based on need (0e1) (%) 276 7.03 276 3.9 276 3.9
(0.451) (0.683) (0.620)
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Beta are coefﬁcients for continuous variables and percentage changes for binary indicators and their means.
P-values in parentheses.
Bonferroni adjustment accounting for intra-outcomes correlation: p-value threshold for joint signiﬁcance of the family of outcomes at 5%: 0.002474.
Calculates based on 22 internal accountability non aggregated indicators, 274 pairwise correlations excluding diagonal, Average: 0.054079487.
Marginal effects reported for logit.
Sample: 150 health facility in two time periods.
I. Mayumana et al. / Social Science & Medicine 179 (2017) 61e7370
Table 2A
Effect of P4P on ﬁnancial accountability and resource prioritisation, sensitivity analysis.
OLS (Facility SE clustering) OLS (Facility ﬁxed effects) OLS (Facility ﬁxed effects and
standard errors clustered at
the district level)
Logit e Marginal effects
(Facility ﬁxed effects)
N Beta N Beta N Beta N Beta
(P-value) (P-value) (P-value) (P-value)
Facility with functioning CHF (0e1) (%)
295 2.6 295 2.9 295 2.9 56 3.6
(0.729) (0.695) (0.903) (0.856)
Number of CHF members
217 16.8 217 8.5 217 8.5***
(0.194) (0.514) (0.000)
Equipment functioning index (0e1) (%)
295 2.83 295 3.2 295 3.2
(0.512) (0.459) (0.325)
Service delivery disruption due to broken equipment in last 90 days (%)
292 14.3* 292 14.9** 292 14.9 60 18.0
(0.051) (0.044) (0.130) (0.331)
Vaccines stock-out index (0e1) (%)
276 6.66 276 10.2* 276 10.2
(0.257) (0.069) (0.685)
Drug stock-out index (0e1) (%)
295 16.2*** 295 16.9*** 295 16.9
(0.006) (0.004) (0.150)
Medical supplies stock-out index (0e1) (%)
275 14.6*** 275 15.2*** 275 15.2**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.015)
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Beta are coefﬁcients for continuous variables and percentage changes for binary indicators and their means.
P-values in parentheses.
Bonferroni adjustment accounting for intra-outcomes correlation: p-value threshold for joint signiﬁcance of the family of outcomes at 5%: 0.0074331.
Calculates based on 7 ﬁnancing non aggregated indicators, 21 pairwise correlations excluding diagonal, Average: 0.020471429.
Marginal effects reported for logit.
Sample: 150 health facility in two time periods.
Table 3A
Effect of P4P on external accountability indicators, sensitivity analysis.
External accountability indicators OLS (Facility SE
clustering)
OLS (Facility ﬁxed
effects)
OLS (Facility ﬁxed
effects and
standard errors
clustered at the
district level)
Logit (Facility ﬁxed
effects)
N Beta N Beta N Beta N Beta
(P-value) (P-value) (P-value) (P-value)
Facility with governing committee (0e1) (%) 283 3.57 283 2.0 283 2.0 98 12.0
(0.727) (0.852) (0.936) (0.934)
Governing committee met in the past 90 days (0e1) (%) 291 18.0** 291 18.2** 291 18.2 128 7.4
(0.048) (0.048) (0.446) (0.646)
Records of governing committee meeting available (0e1) (%) 250 14.6* 250 6.0 250 6.0 38 13.7
(0.075) (0.470) (0.828) (0.546)
Facility has outreach services (0e1) (%) 295 11.4 295 12.3 295 12.3 86 18.1
(0.204) (0.172) (0.600) (0.222)
Number of outreach visits in past 90 days 295 49.6 295 52.1 295 52.1
(0.413) (0.400) (0.027)
Mean HW satisfaction with safety in community (0e1) (%) 291 14.9 291 17.3* 291 17.3
(0.124) (0.079) (0.470)
Mean HW satisfaction with relationship with local leaders (0e1) (%) 291 11.5 291 11.9 291 11.9
(0.226) (0.219) (0.330)
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Beta are coefﬁcients for continuous variables and percentage changes for binary indicators and their means.
P-values in parentheses.
Bonferroni adjustment accounting for intra-outcomes correlation: p-value threshold for joint signiﬁcance of the family of outcomes at 5%: 0.0081706.
Calculates based on 7 external accountability non aggregated indicators, 21 pairwise correlations excluding diagonal, Average: 0.069085714.
Sample: 150 health facility in two time periods.
Marginal effects reported for logit.
(a) number of outreach visits not included in mean calculation).
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Table 4A
Effect of P4P using a lagged dependent variable approach, sensitivity analysis.
LDV Beta (SE) N
Human resource management
Frequency of supervision
Number of district/regional supervision carried out 0.091 122
(0.291)
Last supervision received in the last 30 days (0e1) (%) 13.191 117
(9.161)
Last supervision received in the last 31e90 days (0e1) (%) 0.639 117
(9.175)
Last supervision received more than 90 days (0e1) (%) 13.371*** 117
(5.099)
Content of supervision from facility surveys
Check records/reports (0e1) (%) 3.866 121
(8.759)
Check drug supply (0e1) (%) 7.601 116
(9.389)
Check service delivery (0e1) (%) 5.191 114
(9.506)
Provide positive feed-back (0e1) (%) 5.177 116
(8.146)
Provide negative feed-back (0e1) (%) 9.448 119
(8.542)
Provide updates (0e1) (%) 2.636 115
(9.356)
Discuss problems (0e1) (%) 1.835 116
(9.445)
Deliver supplies (0e1) (%) 11.438 113
(7.633)
Content of supervision from health worker survey
Bring drugs/supplies (0e1) (%) 10.180 116
(8.290)
Check records (0e1) (%) 4.181 116
(9.083)
Check ﬁnances (0e1) (%) 3.629 116
(4.785)
Observe consultation (0e1) (%) 2.098 116
(6.151)
Check knowledge (0e1) (%) 1.501 116
(7.300)
Instruct on service delivery (0e1) (%) 12.216 116
(8.237)
Instruct on ﬁlling HMIS (0e1) (%) 0.791 116
(6.312)
Discuss performance (0e1) (%) 0.157 116
(7.734)
Inspect facility (0e1) (%) 0.663 116
(8.402)
Do nothing (0e1) (%) 1.320 116
(2.981)
Other
No. of admin./managerial meetings in past 90 days 0.076 122
(0.288)
Health workers reporting selection for training based on need (0e1) (%) 2.316 128
(7.810)
Facility with functioning CHF (0e1) (%) 9.628 145
(6.313)
Number of CHF members 10.663 76
(11.272)
Equipment functioning index (0e1) (%) 4.504 145
(3.861)
Service delivery disruption due to broken equipment in last 90 days (%) 1.845 143
(4.152)
Vaccines stock-out index (0e1) (%) 4.493 127
(3.024)
Drug stock-out index (0e1) (%) 9.954** 145
(4.645)
Medical supplies stock-out index (0e1) (%) 2.935 125
(3.294)
External accountability indicators
Facility with governing committee (0e1) (%) 5.257 134
(7.359)
Governing committee met in the past 90 days (0e1) (%) 17.947** 141
(8.337)
Records of governing committee meeting available (0e1) (%) 1.453 106
(5.220)
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Table 4A (continued )
LDV Beta (SE) N
Facility has outreach services (0e1) (%) 13.573* 145
(7.313)
Number of outreach visits in past 90 days 46.842 145
(52.885)
Mean HW satisfaction with safety in community (0e1) (%) 17.139** 141
(7.250)
Mean HW satisfaction with relationship with local leaders (0e1) (%) 1.747 141
(7.205)
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Beta are coefﬁcients for continuous variables and percentage changes for binary indicators and their means.
Standard Errors-values in parentheses.
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